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The Eighty-eighth Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act of
19631 to remedy "a serious and endemic" problem of sex
discrimination in the private workplace.2 The Equal Pay Act
prescribes "equal pay for equal work," whereby employers must pay
the same wages to employees who perform substantially the same
work.3 An early product of the 1960s' civil rights movement, the
Equal Pay Act protects only employees' wages from sex
discrimination. The Act also provides three specific, and one broad
exception to its discriminatory wage practice prohibition.
© Copyright 1994 by the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights.
" Associate, who specializes in employment discrimination law and commercial
litigation, Betts Patterson & Mines, Seattle, Washington; J.D., University of Chicago,
1992; Member, University of Chicago Law Review; Member, Mandel Legal Aid Clinic,
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29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988).
2 Coming Glass Works Co. v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
3 Id. at 198-99 (noting that "equal work" does not mean "identical work," but means
work which requires substantially the same skill, effort, and responsibility, and is
performed under the same conditions).
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These exceptions allow employers to pay different wages on
the basis of a seniority system, a merit system, a system which
measures earnings based upon quantity or quality of production, or
a system based upon "any other factor other than sex.." While the
three specific exceptions have generated relatively little litigation,
parties have vigorously disagreed as to the scope and substance of the
factor-other-than-sex exception.5 This dispute took on even greater
importance after 1964, when the Civil Rights Act's Bennett
Amendment incorporated the factor-other-than-sex exception into
Title VII as a defense to suits challenging a broad range of
discriminatory practices.'
The Supreme Court has yet to define the proper standard for
determining whether an employer has successfully asserted a factor-
other-than-sex defense, though the Court has generally defined the
employers' burden as requiring proof of a "bona fide" wage
classification system, applied without discrimination on the basis of
sex.7 In struggling to define what the Supreme Court meant by "bona
fide," lower courts have developed three different standards which
employers must meet to assert a factor-other-than-sex defense.
To fall within the factor-other-than-sex exception, the Fourth,
Seventh and Eighth Circuits require a wage classification system to
be gender-neutral and equally applied (the "gender-neutral" test).8
This test prevents courts and administrative agencies from substituting
their judgment for the employer's regarding non-gender-related
business decisions.9
4 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988).
5 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION § 10.8, at 624-25 (1980).
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988).
' County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170-71 (1981) (holding that the
Bennett Amendment does not restrict Title VII's prohibition of sex-based wage
discrimination to claims for equal pay for equal work).
8 See Brewster v. Barnes, 788 F.2d 985, 992 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that a state
compensation board's failure to pay a female correctional officer the same salary as male
counterparts was not based on a bona fide use of factors other than sex); Fallon v.
Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1211 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that "an employer cannot use a
gender-neutral factor to avoid liability unless the factor is used and applied in good
faith"); Strecker v. Grand Forks Soc. Serv. Bd., 640 F.2d 96 (8th Cir. 1980) (finding
that a state personnel classification system was a valid factor other than sex).
' Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1211.
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In contrast, the Second and Eleventh Circuits have adopted a
standard that is less deferential to the employer. These courts have
narrowed the factor-other-than-sex exception to include only those
wage systems which are related to the performance of the
complaining employee's specific job duties (the "job-relatedness"
test).
10
The Third, Sixth and Ninth Circuits have developed an
intermediary standard, which requires an employer to articulate a
legitimate business reason for its wage classification system (the
"legitimate business reason" test)., This intermediate standard is
poorly articulated, and the circuits adopting the legitimate business
reason test in practice seem to analyze factor-other-than-sex defenses
under either the gender-neutral or job-relatedness rubrics. 2 Thus, the
real split of authority lies between those courts espousing a gender-
neutral test and those circuits requiring proof of job-relatedness.
The two divergent standards have significantly different
effects on employers' ability to order their affairs. For example,
providing family health insurance benefits to those employees who
are the principal breadwinners in their households will be an
acceptable wage classification under the gender-neutral test, but will
violate the Equal Pay Act under the job-relatedness standard.13
Similarly, gender-neutral educational requirements which are applied
to all employees who do the same work do not meet the Second
Circuit's test, unless they bear a reasonable relationship to the job. 4
" See Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 440 (1992); Glenn v. General Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1571
(11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988).
" See Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 473 F.2d 589, 594 (3d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973) (stating that "economic benefits to an employer can
justify a wage differential"); EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir.
1988); Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982).
" Compare Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876 (asserting the legitimate business reason test,
but accepting an employer's gender-neutral explanation) with Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525
(reciting legitimate business reason language, but requiring a showing of job-
relatedness).
'3 See infra text accompanying notes 75-78.
14 See Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525.
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In contrast, the same requirements would constitute factors other than
sex under the gender-neutral standard. 5
This Article will argue that the gender-neutral standard is the
proper test by which to evaluate an employer's factor-other-than-sex
defense. The Article will examine the Equal Pay Act's purposes and
provisions. It will also explain the differences between those courts
employing the gender-neutral standard, and those courts limiting the
factor-other-than-sex exception to job-related factors. Furthermore,
it will argue that the gender-neutral test is the proper standard for the
factor-other-than-sex defense.
This Article also contends that the Equal Pay Act's legislative
history shows a congressional intent to defer to employers'
nondiscriminatory decisions, and to broaden the permissible factors
beyond those that are merely job-related. Additionally, this Article
contends that the factor-other-than-sex exception should be subjected
to a gender-neutral standard similar to the one applied to the
seniority, merit and incentive system exceptions. Finally, the Article
proposes that the gender-neutral test should be applied so as to
harmonize the Equal Pay Act with Title VII.
II. The Equal Pay Act of 1963: Text and Purpose
Though Congress intended the Equal Pay Act of 1963 to serve
as a "broad charter of women's rights,""t competing considerations
of employer autonomy compelled Congress to limit an aggrieved
employee's remedies to wage differences based upon sex
discrimination. 7 The Equal Pay Act provides:
" See infra text accompanying notes 79-92.
16 Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir. 1970); see 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d)(1)(iv) (1988) (ensuring that female workers are paid the same wages for the
same work as their male counterparts under the same conditions, unless the wage
differential is based upon anything other than gender).
"7 See infra text accompanying notes 115-42. In contrast, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 provides causes of action for discrimination on the basis of race,
religion, sex or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). Also, a Title VII
plaintiff may seek remedies not only for wage disparities, but also for discriminatory
hiring, firing and promotional practices. Id.; see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 429-30 (1971) (holding that an employment practice that operates to exclude blacks,
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No employer having employees subject to any
provisions of this section shall discriminate, within
any establishment on the basis of sex . . . for equal
work on jobs the performance of which requires equal
skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are
performed under similar working conditions, except
where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a
seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system
which measures earnings by quantity or quality of
production; or (iv).a differential based on any other
factor other than sex. 18
In order to establish a prima facie case of wage
discrimination, a complaining employee must show that: (1) higher
wages are paid to employees of the opposite sex; (2) the male and
female employees do equal work which requires substantially equal
skill, effort and responsibility; and (3) the work is performed under
similar working conditions.' 9 Once the employee has made out a
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to assert one of
the Act's four affirmative defenses.2 ° Several courts allow the
complaining employee to defeat an employer's affirmative defense
with evidence that the employer's wage classification system is
pretextual or was applied with discriminatory intent.21
which is not related to job performance, is prohibited under Title VII, notwithstanding
the employer's lack of discriminatory intent); McDonnell Douglas, Inc. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (holding that employers faced with allegations of discriminatory
hiring or firing practices can carry their burden of proof by showing some independent
non-racially motivated reason for their action, although an aggrieved party will still be
afforded an adequate opportunity to show that the employer's reason is only a pretext
for discrimination).
18 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988).
19 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
20 Id. at 197.
21 See Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 526 (2d Cir. 1992);
Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982); Strecker v. Grand Forks
Soc. Serv. Bd., 640 F.2d 96, 101 n.2 (8th Cir. 1980).
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IlL Judicial Treatment of the Factor-Other-Than-Sex Defense
The Supreme Court has considered the scope of the factor-
other-than-sex defense on only two occasions. In Corning Glass
Works Co. v. Brennan,"2 female day shift inspectors alleged that
Corning's policy of paying higher wages to its night shift inspectors,
who were all male, violated the Equal Pay Act's equal pay for equal
work requirement.23 The wage disparity originated in 1930, when
New York and Pennsylvania state laws prohibited women from
working night shifts.24 At that time, Corning made an offer of higher
wages to its male employees in an attempt to lure them into the night
shift inspector positions, which were considered less desirable than
day shifts." Although New York and Pennsylvania repealed their
prohibitory laws in 1964, Corning did not permit women on the night
shift until 1966, when it concluded a collective bargaining agreement
with labor representatives.26 The collective bargaining agreement,
however, contained a provision whereby Corning continued to pay
higher wages to those night inspectors hired before the effective date
of the collective bargaining agreement (all of those inspectors being
male).27 In effect, Corning paid some male inspectors more than its
female inspectors for the same work.
Corning argued that the prior state laws prohibiting women
from working on the night shift, coupled with the heavier burdens of
working at night accounted for the pay differential, and thus
constituted permissible factors other than sex. 8
The Court accepted Corning's argument that different shifts
could constitute permissible factors other than sex, but noted that the
pay differential between Corning's night and day shift inspectors was
greater than the differential between its other night and day shift
employees.29 Corning's only explanation for the inspectors' salary
417 U.S. 188 (1974).
2 Id. at 190.
24 Id. at 191.
2 Id. at 191-92 n.3.
6 Id. at 194.
7 Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 194.
I ld. at 203 n.24.
29 Id. at 205-06.
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differential was that Corning had to pay its male employees more
because they considered the work "demeaning," whereas its female
employees were willing to accept lower wages.3" The Court found
this policy to be gender-related-paying women less because women
will work for less-and in violation of the Equal Pay Act. 3
In City of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v.
Manhart,32 the Supreme Court held that the Department's policy of
requiring employees to make differential contributions to their
pension fund violated the Equal Pay Act because the differential was
determined through sex-linked mortality tables.33 The Department
based its pension policy on mortality tables which showed that
women generally live longer than men, making women's pension
plans more costly.34
The Court rejected the Department's longevity argument,
affirming the lower courts' finding that the Department's policy
facially discriminated on the basis of sex.35 The Court did not decide
the issue of whether more than a showing of facial neutrality and
equal application was necessary for the factor-other-than-sex
defense.36
The Supreme Court's failure to define the factor-other-than-
sex defense has created confusion in the lower courts. The circuit
courts disagree as to the best standard for judicial inquiries into
employers' proffered factors other than sex. Three formally distinct
tests have developed. At least three circuits require the employer to
demonstrate that a gender-neutral classification system, applied
equally to all employees, accounts for the wage disparity (the
"gender-neutral" test).37 Two circuits require proof that facially
gender-neutral systems bear a reasonable relationship to the
30 Id. at 205.
I' id. at 209-10.
32 435 U.S. 702 (1977).
id. at 711.
34Id. at 705 (noting that a woman will receive more payments, on the average, than
will a man).
" Id. at 712-13.
36 See id. at 717-18.
37 See Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1211-12 (7th Cir. 1989); Brewster v.
Barnes, 788 F.2d 985, 992-93 (4th Cir. 1986); Strecker v. Grand Forks Soc. Serv. Bd.,
640 F.2d 96, 100-02 (8th Cir. 1980).
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performance of the complaining employee's job duties (the "job-
relatedness" test)." At least two circuits have applied a standard
intermediate to the other two tests, for which the employer must show
that its facially gender-neutral system was adopted for a legitimate
business reason (the "legitimate business reason" test). 9
Though the legitimate business reason test is formally
distinguishable from the other two standards, courts applying the
legitimate business reason standard in practice embrace one of the
two more extreme tests.4" Thus, the true dispute lies between those
courts applying the gender-neutral test and those courts requiring job-
relatedness.
A. The Gender-Neutral Test
The Third, Fourth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits have adopted
a two-part standard for evaluating employers' proffered factor-other-
than-sex defenses. The employer must first show that its
classification is not a proxy for gender.4' If the classification is
gender-neutral, the courts then inquire as to whether the proffered
system is applied equally without regard to gender.42
38 Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir. 1992); Glenn
v. General Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1988).
'9 See EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 1988); Kouba v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982) ("An employer thus cannot use a
factor which causes a wage differential between male and female employees absent an
acceptable business reason."); Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 473 F.2d 589, 594
(3d Cir. 1973) ("The overwhelming evidence which showed that the men's department
was more profitable than the women's was sufficient to justify the differences in base
salary.").
4 See, e.g., Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876 (accepting an employer's gender-neutral
explanation for a wage differential after asserting the legitamite business reason test).
4" See Strecker, 640 F.2d at 101 n.2 (noting that the plaintiff may rebut the
defendant's affirmative defense with evidence of discriminatory intent or pretext).




A classification must be more than gender-neutral on its
face.43 Thus, courts will reject classifications that are simply proxies
for gender.' For example, in Hodgson v. Fainnont Supply Co. ,4 the
Fourth Circuit determined that Fairmont's informal "training
program" was a pretext for sex discrimination because the program
"was sex oriented and was not made available to women. "46  The
"training program" was "nothing more than the process by which one
might work his way up in the company. 147
In Fallon v. Illinois,48 the Seventh Circuit invoked the gender
neutral standard, but failed to inquire whether the State's proffered
defense, compliance with a law requiring it to hire only military
veterans, was actually a proxy for gender.49 The Seventh Circuit
should have questioned whether a veterans-only statute bore such a
substantial relationship to gender that it could not constitute a valid
factor-other-than-sex. Such a gender-relatedness inquiry comports
with the Seventh Circuit's other factor-other-than-sex defense cases,
and with the gender-neutral test in general.5°
43 Hodgson v. Fairmont Supply Co., 454 F.2d 490, 499 (4th Cir. 1972). But see
Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1206 (accepting a facially gender-neutral system as a valid factor
other than sex without inquiring further); J. C. Penney, 843 F.2d at 254 (holding that
reducing costs is a valid factor other than sex).
"See, e.g., Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 207-08 (holding that wage
differentials based on gender are unjust); Fainnont Supply, 454 F.2d at 497 n.6 (finding
that training programs available to employees of one sex will be "carefully examined"
in order to determine whether they violate the Equal Pay Act).
4' 454 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1972).
46Id. at 498. "We cannot accept a training program coterminous with a stereotyped
province called 'man's work' as a factor other than sex." Id.
7 Id. at 499. "Mr. Mason worked at the stock desk for three and one-half years.
In this context it is absurd for the company to claim that Mr. Mason worked there only
temporarily in order to become familiar with that part of the company's operations."
Id.
4' 882 F.2d 1206 (7th Cir. 1989).
49 Id. at 1212.
So See, e.g., Covington v. Southern I11. Univ., 816 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (holding that the University's salary retention policy
qualified as a valid factor other than sex); Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass Consortium, 769
F.2d 1251 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding as a factor other than sex a reorganization of the
employer that resulted in a male employee being paid more than his female predecessor,
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2. Equal Application
A substantively gender-neutral classification system is not a
valid factor other than sex unless it is also applied equally. The
employer must show that, though gender-neutral, the system is not
applied to favorably benefit male employees." Like the substantive
gender-neutrality requirement, the equal application requirement
attempts to prevent employers from fabricating pretextual or post-
event justifications for wage disparities.5 2 Where the employer does
not demonstrate equal application, its factor-other-than-sex defense
will fail. 3
However, a gender-neutral classification system which is
applied equally constitutes a valid factor other than sex. In Peters v.
City of Shreveport,54  female police communications officers
challenged the City's practice of paying higher salaries to its male
fire communications officers as a violation of the Equal Pay Act and
Title VII."5 The City argued that the pay differential was due to a
state statute prescribing minimum salary levels for fire department
employees.5 6 The court ruled that compliance with the statute was a
valid factor other than sex because the City applied the law to all of
its employees and differentiated between employees not on the basis
of sex, but on the basis of whether or not an employee worked for
the fire department.5 7
who was discharged prior to the implementation of the reorganization plan); Ende v.
Board of Regents, 757 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that university action in
developing and applying an "affirmative action equity adjustment formula" to female
faculty members' salaries in order to remedy the effects of past discrimination did not
violate male faculty members' rights protected by the Equal Pay Act).
5' See, e.g., Fairmont Supply, 454 F.2d at 498; Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1211; Strecker,
640 F.2d at 102 n.7.
52 See, e.g., Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1211 (holding that a gender neutral factor was not
meant to provide a convenient escape from liability).
53 See, e.g., Fainnont Supply, 454 F.2d at 498 (finding that the employer did not
demonstrate equal application because its exclusive training program was sex-oriented
and not made available to women).
14 818 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1987).
" Id. at 1150-51.
56 Id. at 1151; see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:1992(9) (West Supp. 1986).
57 Peters, 818 F.2d at 1162. The case was remanded for reconsideration of other
evidence which may have indicated that the City discriminated on the basis of sex. Id.
GENDER-NEUTRALITY
B. The Legitimate Business Reason Test
Along with'the circuits using the gender-neutral test, the Sixth
and Ninth Circuits also require gender-neutrality." However, after
finding gender-neutrality, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits turn their
inquiry to the employer's business rationale for using the proffered
factor other than sex. 9 Under the test articulated in Kouba v.
Allstate Insurance Co. ,60 an employer must show that a legitimate
business reason is reasonably related to its wage system.6' While it
is a formally distinct standard, in practice the legitimate business
reason standard parallels either the gender-neutral or job-relatedness
tests.62
Some courts have adopted such a broad definition of
"legitimate business reason" that almost any gender-neutral
justification suffices, if it is equally applied.63 This expansive view
of the legitimate business reason test effectively follows the gender-
neutral standard's form of analysis. For example, in Kouba, the
Ninth Circuit instructed the district court on remand to determine
whether Allstate equally applied its policy of basing agents'
guaranteed minimum salaries on each agent's prior salary.' 4 Also,
the court instructed the district court to investigate Allstate's claim
that its policy was intended "to motivate [its] agent[s] to make sales,"
implying that Allstate's claimed purpose might be pretextual.65
"8 See, e.g., Bence v. Detroit Health Corp., 712 F.2d 1024, 1031 (6th Cir. 1983);
Manhart v. City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power, 553 F.2d 581, 591 (9th Cir. 1977).
59 See Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. J.C.
Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 252 (6th Cir. 1988).
6 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982).
61 Id. at 876.
' See id. (accepting employer's gender-neutral explanation).
6 See, e.g., J.C. Penney, 843 F.2d at 253 (holding that a "head of household"
provision of a medical and dental employee insurance plan did not violate Title VII's
prohibition against gender discrimination because J.C. Penney's need to "cut costs"
constituted a legitimate business reason); Kouba, 691 F.2d at 877 (finding that wage
differentials designed to "motivate" employees or "predict a new employee's
performance" can be valid factors other than sex); Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc.,
473 F.2d 589, 594 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding any "economic benefit to an employer"
constitutes a legitimate business reason).
' 691 F.2d at 877.
65 id.
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Conversely, the Second Circuit has limited the legitimate
business reason test to require a nexus between the employer's wage
system and the complaining employee's specific job duties and
responsibilities.66  The Second Circuit's nexus requirement
corresponds to the job-relatedness test applied by the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits.67
C. The Job-Relatedness Test
In Aldrich v. Randolph Central School District,68 the Second
Circuit explained the reasoning behind the job-relatedness test:
"Without a job-relatedness requirement, the factor-other-than-sex
defense would provide a gaping loophole in the statute through which
many pretexts for discrimination would be sanctioned."69 To guard
against the dangers of pretext, the Second Circuit stated that the
proper inquiry was whether the employer classified its employees
with criteria reasonably related to the performance of the employee's
specific job duties.70 Several commentators advocate this standard,
arguing that a job-relatedness requirement best prevents the dangers
of pretextual wage classification systems.71
See Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir. 1992).
67 See Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970); Glenn v.
General Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1988). But see Wu v. Thomas, 847
F.2d 1480, 1485 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988) (holding that a
university's equally applied policy of setting professors' salaries based upon their prior
experience and scholarly publications is a factor other than sex); Plemer v. Parsons-
Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1137 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that a pay differential based on
prior experience and the need to counter another employer's offer of higher salary is a
factor other than sex).
6' 963 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1992).
69 Id. at 525; see Judith A. Pauley, The Exception Swallows the Rule: Market
Conditions as a "Factor Other Than Sex" in Title VII Disparate Impact Litigation, 86 W.
VA. L. REv. 165 (1983) (urging courts to adopt a legitimate business reason standard
in order to guard against pretextual abuses of the factor-other-than-sex defense).
7o Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 526-27.
71 See generally Nina J. Kimball, Note, Not Just Any "Factor Other Than Sex": An
Analysis of the Fourth Affirmative Defense of the Equal Pay Act, 52 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 318, 330-36 (1983) (arguing that the defense should be limited to job-related
factors, or factors enumerated in the Act); Carole S. Katz, Note, Wage Discrimination
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Only wage systems that have an underlying basis of job-
relatedness will qualify as factors other than sex.72 By focusing on
an employee's duties, rather than an employer's lack of
discriminatory motive, the job-relatedness test recasts many
commonly accepted wage systems as invalid under the Equal Pay
Act. An employer asserting a factor-other-than-sex defense under the
job-relatedness standard must provide different evidence than if the
same defense were evaluated under a gender-neutral standard. Under
the job-relatedness test, employers must concentrate their evidence,
not upon the equal application of a gender-neutral system to all
employees, but upon proof that its system bears a rational relationship
to a specific duty or job.73 As discussed below, this shift in emphasis
has at least two effects. First, systems valid under the gender
neutral, equally applied test are often invalid for lack of job-
relatedness. Second, the judicial inquiry ceases to focus solely upon
sex discrimination by adding an inquiry into economic relationships.
D. The Practical Differences Between the Two Standards
Wage classifications which relate to employees'job duties will
be valid factors other than sex if they are applied
nondiscriminatorily. 7 However, many gender-neutral classifications
will not meet the job-relatedness standard. Following are examples
of classifications valid under the gender-neutral test, but invalid under
the job-relatedness standard.
Claims: Employee's Prior Salary Fails the "Factor Other Than Sex" Test, 15 CoLum.
HUM. RTs. L. REV. 207 (1984); SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 624-25.
7' Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 524.
73 Id. at 525.
74 See, e.g., Peters v. City of Shreveport, 818 F.2d 1148, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 1987)
(holding that compliance with statutorily prescribed salaries was a valid factor other than
sex where applied equally to all employees).
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1. A Head of Household Provision
Some businesses offer health insurance plans to an employee's
family members where that employee is the "head of the
household. "" The gender-neutral and job-relatedness standards treat
head of household insurance programs differently. As the Sixth
Circuit held in EEOC v. J. C. Penney Co. ,76 an employer may assert
a factor-other-than-sex defense under a gender-neutral analysis if the
head of household provision is equally applied." But, under the job-
relatedness test, an employer could not assert the factor-other-than-
sex defense, as health insurance for an employee's spouse rarely, if
ever, relates to the employee's specific duties.78
2. Prior Experience and Education
Many employers use an employee's prior experience or level
of education as a factor in computing his or her wage or salary.79
75 See EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 250 (6th Cir. 1988). A "head of
household" provision allows an employee to elect coverage for his or her spouse, but
only if the spouse earns less than the employee. Id. The idea behind the "head of
household" provision is to provide efficient coverage to those spouses who are dependent
on their spouse and who might not have adequate coverage. See id. at 253. Behind this
policy is the assumption that the spouse who earns the higher salary will have access to
better insurance coverage. See id.
76 843 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1988).
77 Id. at 253-54.
7' See 29 C.F.R. § 1620.21 (1986) ("Since a 'head of household' .. status bears
no relationship to the requirements of the job or to the individual's performance on the
job, such a claimed defense to an alleged [Equal Pay Act] violation will be closely
scrutinized. ... ). Although EEOC guidelines carry some authoritative weight, the
Supreme Court has held that they are not dispositive of an issue. See County of
Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 177-78 (1981). Thus, § 1620.21 does not
dispose of the head of household provision as a factor other than sex. See Fallon v.
Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1218 (7th Cir. 1989) (rejecting EEOC interpretations where they
are at odds with judicial precedent).
79 See, e.g., Irby v. Bittick, 830 F. Supp. 632, 637 (M.D. Ga. 1993) (holding that,
although prior experience may be used as a pretext for discrimination, it was a genuine
basis for salary differential); Jones v. Westside-Urban Health Ctr., 760 F. Supp. 1575,
1577 (S.D. Ga. 1991) (higher salaries allegedly paid because of superior education and
prior work experience).
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While the gender-neutral test accepts these factors as gender-neutral
a priori, the job-relatedness test will reject those factors which are not
shown to have a sufficient nexus to the job's specific duties or their
performance. 8
In Covington v. Southern Illinois University,"' a female
advisor to art students brought suit under Title VII and the Equal Pay
Act, claiming that Southern Illinois University (SIU) discriminated
against her on the basis of sex by paying her less than her male
predecessor for performing the same work. 2 SIU argued that its
policy of basing faculty salaries on their prior teaching experience
and academic degrees was a factor other than sex. 3 Ms. Covington's
predecessor had several more years of teaching experience and a
higher academic degree than she did.84
In holding that SIU had established a valid factor-other-than-
sex-defense, the court did not require SIU to prove that prior teaching
experience or higher academic degrees contributed to the performance
of an art advisor's duties, though SIU likely could have done so. In
fact, although Ms. Covington had done an "outstanding" job as art
advisor 5 (better than her predecessor, who was transferred to the
music department because of poor performance), 86 the court deferred
to SIU's wage classification system in recognition of the fact that,
though there may be isolated instances of wage disparity due to
nondiscriminatory factors, the employer was best positioned to
determine those factors which reflect an employee's value.8 7
In contrast, the job-relatedness test rejects as a factor-other-
than-sex defense prior qualifications and formal education without a
showing of relatedness to the duties performed. For instance, the
go See Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970) (rejecting
orderlies' expertise and formal training as a valid factor other than sex where such was
not shown to be related to job performance).
"' 816 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
82 Id. at 318.
83Id. at 321.
4 Id. at 319-20.
83Id. at 320.
86 Covington, 816 F.2d at 319.
87 Id. at 321-22.
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Fifth Circuit held, in Hodgson v. Brookhaven General Hospital,8" that
the hospital would be in violation of the Equal Pay Act if it could not
show that wage disparities between male orderlies and female nurses'
aides were based upon a merit system administered systematically and
objectively.8 9 The hospital had argued that the wage disparity was the
result of the orderlies' greater expertise and formal training.9"
However, the court stated that the hospital failed to prove the
relevance of such qualifications to the performance of the orderlies'
duties.9" The court remanded the case so that more evidence could
be introduced by the hospital to establish a valid factor other than sex
by showing affirmative proof of the formal training's relatedness to
the orderlies' duties (presumably, duties not performed by nurses'
aides).92
3. Formal, Firm-Wide Systems
Employers with many employees often use wage classification
systems which harmonize salaries inter-departmentally or among
several plants or offices.93 These standardized classification systems
will usually be upheld as factors other than sex, if they are facially
gender-neutral and applied equally." For example, in Patkus v.
Sangamon-Cass Consortium,95 the Seventh Circuit held that an
employer's reorganization plan was a valid factor-other-than-sex
defense to an Equal Pay Act suit where the plaintiff claimed that the
employer paid a male employee more than his female predecessor,
436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970).




" Governments are prime examples of employers using standardized wage
classification systems. See, e.g., Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520,
522 (2d Cir. 1992); Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass Consortium, 769 F.2d 1251, 1260-61 (7th
Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Maricopa County, 736 F.2d 510, 512 (9th Cir. 1984).
' See Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 528; Patkus, 769 F.2d at 1259-60.
9' 769 F.2d 1251 (7th Cir. 1985).
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who was discharged before the reorganization plan was
implemented.96
The plaintiff likely would have prevailed had she brought her
claim in the Second or Eleventh Circuits, as the reorganization plan
did not relate to the specific duties she performed while in the
Consortium's employ."
4. Compliance with State or Local Labor Laws
State and local governments often enact labor laws which
impact employees' wages by specifying certain employment practices,
like a minimum wage9" or the mandatory hiring of veterans.99 The
two standards again diverge when considering whether an employer's
compliance with such laws constitutes a valid factor other than sex.
Under the gender-neutral standard, a wage classification system based
upon the requirements of state or local laws has been upheld as a
valid factor other than sex. In Peters v. City of Shreveport,100 female
police communications officers challenged the City's practice of
paying higher salaries to its male fire communications officers
alleging, inter alia, violations of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII.1 °1
The City argued that the pay differential was due to a state statute 02
prescribing minimum salary levels for fire communications officers.0 3
The court remanded the case for reconsideration, holding that reliance
on state law constituted a factor other than sex."°
96 Id. at 1261-62.
' See Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525; Glenn v. General Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567,
1571 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988).
See, e.g., N.Y. LABOR LAW § 650 (McKinney 1988).
See Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1989) (analyzing, as a factor
other than sex, a state statute which mandates that field offices of the Illinois Department
of Veterans Affairs be staffed by veterans).
"0o 818 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 930 (1988).
0 Id. at 1151.
102 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:1992(9) (West 1986).
'03 Peters, 818 F.2d at 1151.
104 Id. at 1162-63.
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In Fallon v. Illinois,1 5 the Seventh Circuit adopted a similar
rule when it held that the State's reliance on a state statute requiring
that certain employees be war veterans was a factor other than sex
where the State applied the requirement without regard to sex.' 6
Conversely, in Aldrich v. Randolph Central School District,
10 7
the Second Circuit rejected the School District's argument that
compliance with a local civil service law constituted a factor other
than sex. 08 The law required "cleaners" to score in the top three on
a civil service examination before they could be promoted to the
"custodian" position.10 9  The court found that the examination
requirement, though gender-neutral on its face, was not related to
performance of a custodian's or cleaner's duties (which the court
found to be the same), and thus was not a factor other than sex."'
IV. The Proper Test for the Factor-Other-Than-Sex Exception
The best standard to apply to the factor-other-than-sex
exception is the gender-neutral test, provided courts diligently
investigate employers' proffered factors for evidence of pretext or
discriminatory intent. Complaining employees should be allowed to
present evidence of pretext or discriminatory intent in order to help
courts determine whether a proffered factor other than sex is bona
fide.
The element of "gender neutrality" is a substantive question,
requiring courts to examine the proffered factor's relationship to
gender. As in City of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v.
Manhart,"' where pension fund contributions based upon an
employee's estimated longevity violated the Equal Pay Act,112 a factor
which bears a substantial relationship to gender does not qualify as
882 F.2d 1206 (7th Cir. 1989).
Io ld. at 1212; see supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
'o 963 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 440 (1992).
Io d. at 526-27.
'09 See id. at 522.
110 Id. at 526-27.
... 435 U.S. 702 (1977).
112 Id. at 712-13; see supra text accompanying notes 32-36.
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gender-neutral." 3 Thus, in Fallon, the Seventh Circuit should have
examined the extent of the relationship between veteran's status and
gender more closely before determining that the veterans-only law
was a valid factor other than sex.1 14
Courts should scrutinize the "equal application" element of the
gender-neutral test with similar diligence. Courts must ask whether
the system is applied uniformly to all employees, and if not, whether
there is a gender-neutral basis for excepting some employees from the
system. Again, plaintiffs may aid the court with evidence showing
that the proffered system is not uniformly applied, or that it was not
so applied in the instant case, or that the basis for not applying the
system is gender-related.
In support of the gender-neutral standard, this section will
argue: (1) that Congress intended to create an exception which
encompasses more than merely job-related factors; (2) that the factor-
other-than-sex exception should be subjected to a gender-neutral
standard similar to the one applied to the seniority, merit and
incentive system exceptions; and (3) that the gender-neutral test
should be applied so as to harmonize the Equal Pay Act with Title
VII.
A. The Equal Pay Act's Legislative History
As the first bill passed into law which regulated wages based
on sex discrimination, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 was a more modest
attempt to remedy employer discrimination than, for example, the
later Civil Rights Act of 1964115 or the Civil Rights Act of 1991.116
The Act's conservative tenor is reflected in its grant of private rights
of action only for wage disparities,117 the legislative concern with
113 See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 712-13.
114 See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
"' Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
16 Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
17 See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988). Title VII, in contrast, grants a right of action
for refusing to hire an individual, or otherwise discriminating against an individual,
because of the individual's sex. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
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employer autonomy,' 18 and the inclusion of the factor-other-than-sex
defense.119  The Act's language 12' and legislative history disclose
Congress' intent to remedy the problem of sex discrimination in the
workplace and create a fair, competitive environment for
employers.121 Congress added the factor-other-than-sex exception in
an effort to achieve these goals.
22
The influx of women into the American workplace as a result
of World War II magnified the effects of some employers' practice
of paying women lower wages than men. 23 In 1948, and later in
1950, Congress addressed this issue through several bills proposing
the elimination of discriminatory wage practices where men and
women performed comparable work. 1
24
118 See 109 CONG. REC. 9206 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Goodell) (discussing various
systems causing pay discrepencies that employers may implement which would not be
violative of the Act).
119 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988).
120 Section 2(a) of the Act sets out the economic concerns, including unfair
competition, giving rise to the movement for equal pay for equal work legislation:
The Congress hereby finds that the existence in industries
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce
of wage differentials based on sex-
(1) depresses wages and living standards for employees
necessary for their health and efficiency;
(2) prevents the maximum utilization of the available labor
resources;
(3) tends to cause labor disputes, thereby burdening,
affecting, and obstructing commerce;
(4) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in
commerce; and
(5) constitutes an unfair method of competition.
Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 2(a), 77 Stat. 56, 56 (1963).
121 See Katz, supra note 71, at 212 (arguing that Congress was concerned with
employer flexibility and autonomy as well as prohibiting employers from engaging in
sex-based discrimination).
2 See id.
1 See Equal Pay for Equal Work for Women: Hearings on H.R. 4273 and
H.R. 4408 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1948).
124 Id. at 1-11; Equal Pay for Equal Work for Women. Hearings on H.R. 1584 and
H.R. 2438 Before the Special Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
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Like its predecessors, 25  legislators wrote the Equal
Pay Act of 1963 primarily for the benefit of female workers." 6 But
the Eighty-eighth Congress, unlike earlier Congresses, recognized the
competitive difficulties employers would encounter if they were
required to justify wage differentials between substantially different
jobs.' 27 Accordingly, Congress amended out the "comparable work"
standard, and replaced it with a more limited "equal work"
requirement. 
28
The Supreme Court has noted that this concern for employers'
competitive freedom also led Congress to add the broad factor-other-
than-sex exception. 129 As stated in the House Committee's report,
"any other factor other than sex" is a broad exception designed to
include classification systems considered too numerous to list, or not
contemplated by Congress. 3 ' This broad exception reflected
Congress' attempt to structure the Act to focus solely upon sex
discrimination,"' without having courts "substitute their judgment for
" See, e.g., H.R. 4408, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1947), reprinted in Equal Pay
for Equal Work for Women, Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the Comm. on
Education and Labor on H.R. 4273 and H.R. 4408, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1948).
'" See Equal Pay Act of 1963." Hearings on S. 882 and S. 910 Before the Subcomm.
on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welf., 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
'2 See 109 CONG. REC. 9197 (1963) (remarks by Rep. Griffin) (noting concern over
possible Labor Department review of salary discrepancies between male and female
workers with different jobs).
12 Id. (remarks by Reps. Griffin and Goodell) (noting the amendment of the
comparable work standard to an equal work requirement).
"z County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170-71 n.11 (1981); see 109 CONG.
REC. 9203 (1963) (remarks by Rep. Griffin) (noting that the factor-other-than-sex
defense is a "broad principle," and that employers need not put a practice or system into
writing in order for it to qualify as a defense).
130 See H.R. Rep. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963), reprinted in 1963
U.S.C.C.A.N. 687, 689; 109 CONG. REc. 9203, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (remarks
of Rep. Griffin). Rep. Griffin stated: "[The factor other than sex exception] is a broad
principle, and those preceding it are really examples: such factors as a seniority system,
a merit system, or a system which measures earnings on the basis of quality or quantity
of production." Id.
131 See 109 CONG. REC. 9196 (1963). Rep. Frelinghuysen, a proponent of the Act,
in discussing the desire to ameliorate the danger of using the Act to reach legitimate
wage practices said, "[d]iscrimination that operates against both men and women is not
prohibited. The only thing prohibited is a difference in pay that is based solely on sex."
Id.; see 109 CONG. REC. 9198 (1963) (remarks by Reps. Griffin and Goodell, the Act's
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the judgment of the employer and his experts who have established
and applied a bona fide job rating system. ,,'
3 2
Literally interpreting the exception to allow any factor other
than sex would permit discriminating employers to avoid Equal Pay
Act liability by invoking pretextual wage systems as an affirmative
defense.133 Several courts have cited the danger of pretextual systems
as a justification for requiring proof of either job-relatedness, 134 or a
legitimate business reason. 135 But courts applying the gender-neutral
test have argued that Congress ameliorated this danger by charging
the courts with the task of ensuring that employers' standards are
applied equally, without regard to gender. 136
The Supreme Court has also pointed out that, although
Congress eschewed the broadest interpretation of the "factor other
than sex" language, it also purposefully refused to limit the exception
to only those factors considered during committee and floor
debates. 137  The most obvious acceptable factors considered were
those systems relating to the performance of an employee's job
duties: "Thus, among other things, shift differentials, restrictions on
sponsors, stating that sex is the sole restriction created by the Act).
132 109 CONG. REC. 9208-09 (1963) (remarks by the Act's sponsor, Rep. Goodell).
Rep. Goodell also noted that, "if [the employer] has a reasonable standard of
differentiation, the Labor Department is not to come in, even, and judge the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of this differentiation .... ." Id. at 9208. Until
1978, the Labor Department was the administrative agency responsible for enforcing the
Equal Pay Act. Peters v. City of Shreveport, 818 F.2d 1148, 1156 (5th Cir. 1987). In
1978, President Carter shifted the duty to enforce the Act to the newly created EEOC.
Exec. Order 12,067, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1978), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1988). This shift, however, did not alter the scope of the administrative duties vis-a-vis
the Act. As such, Congress' limitations on the Labor Department's duties apply with
equal force to the EEOC.
1 See Strecker v. Grand Forks Soc. Serv. Bd., 640 F.2d 96, 101 n.2 (8th Cir.
1980); Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982).
134 See, e.g., Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 525-26 (2d Cir.
1992) (arguing that, without applying a job-relatedness standard, and giving the plaintiff
an opportunity to rebut the factor-other-than-sex defense, defendants could prevail with
pretextual classification systems).
131 See Kouba, 691 F.2d at 878.
136 See Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1211 (7th Cir. 1989) (interpreting the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Congressional intent in County of Washington v.
Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 171 (1981)).
' See Coming Glass Works Co. v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 201 (1974).
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or differences based on time of day worked, hours of work, lifting or
moving heavy objects, differences based on experience, training, or
ability would also be excluded. It also recognizes certain special
circumstances, such as 'red circle rates.'"""
But, Congress also intended numerous non-job-related systems
to qualify as factors other than sex. For example, "differentials
relating to ... insurance costs of all employees," and,"where [the
employer] paid something additional to employees that were heads of
families ... would be all right under the present bill. "139 Moreover,
Representative Goodell noted that "[t]here are a good many other
examples that could be given-all valid under this bill as written,
provided the employer does not base his differential on sex. "1140
Though several lower courts have acknowledged Congress'
intention to extend the exception's protections beyond job-related
factors,141 no court has stated that Congress' refusal to limit the
factor-other-than-sex defense definitively supports the gender-neutral
"I H.R. Rep. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963), reprinted in 1963
U.S.C.C.A.N. 687, 689. "Red circle rates" is a term coined by President Roosevelt's
National War Labor Board which describes unusually high wage rates maintained for a
valid reason, like in the situation where, because of understaffing, an overqualified
employee is temporarily reassigned to a less demanding position. See id.
139 109 CONG. REC. 9206 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Goodell). One commentator has
interpreted the legislative history as expressing a congressional intent to limit the factor-
other-than-sex defense to job-related factors. Nina J. Kimball, Note, Not Just Any
"Factor Other Than Sex": An Analysis of the Fourth Affirmative Defense of the Equal
Pay Act, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 318 (1984). But, to interpret'the legislative history
as requiring job-relatedness ignores congressional consideration of non-job-related
factors, and goes against legislators' expressed desire to create an open-ended exception
to the Act. Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit has pointed out, the statutory definition of
"equal work" already includes the standard components of job-related systems (skill,
responsibility, effort and working conditions). Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d
873, 877 (9th Cir. 1992). To limit the factor other than sex exception to job-related
factors would render it virtually redundant, or at most, extremely limited in scope. Such
a formulation is at odds with Congress' intent to create a "broad general exception." See
H.R. Rep. No. 309, 88th Cong., lst Sess. (1963), reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 687,
689.
140 109 CONG. REC. 9206 (1963).
141 See Kouba, 691 F.2d at 877 (noting that limiting the factor other-than-sex-
exception to job-related factors would render it mere surplusage in light of the job-
related factors already encompassed by the "equal work" requirement); Hodgson v.
Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 473 F.2d 589, 595 (3d Cir. 1973); Bence v. Detroit Health
Corp., 712 F.2d 1024, 1029 (6th Cir. 1983).
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test. Nonetheless, in a world of two choices, Congress' refusal to
limit the exception to job-related factors'42 should lead courts to adopt
the gender-neutral test as the only viable alternative standard for the
factor-other-than-sex defense.
B. Applying the Same Standard to All Four of the Equal Pay
Act's Statutory Defenses
The Equal Pay Act's three specific exceptions are subsets of
the broad "factor-other-than-sex" exception. As Representative
Griffin noted, "[the-factor-other-than-sex exception] is a broad
principle, and those preceding it are really examples: Such factors
as a seniority system, a merit system, or a system which measures
earnings on the basis of quality or quantity of production." 43 As a
matter of statutory construction, where, as here, ambiguous or
general terms follow specific phrases, the general term is deemed to
be of "the same kind, class, or nature," and is interpreted in the same
manner as the specific phrases." Accordingly, courts should look
to the standard applied to the Equal Pay Act's three specific defenses
as a guide to determine the appropriate standard for the general
factor-other-than-sex defense. The standard applied to the Equal Pay
Act's three specific exceptions substantively parallels the gender-
neutral test applied to the factor-other-than-sex exception.
An employer defending itself on the basis of either a
seniority, merit, or incentive (quality or quantity of production)
system "must show that [its system] is administered, if not formally,
142 See 109 CONG. REC. 9206 (1963) (remarks by Rep. Goodell). Representative
Thompson, a supporter of the bill, stated, "[t]he language [of the legislation] recognizes
many factors which measure the relationship between jobs and which establish a valid
basis for a difference in pay. We do not want to disturb these .... Thus, among other
things, . . . experience, training or ability would also be exempted." Id. at 9196.
143 109 CONG. REC. 9203 (1963).
144 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION, STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 640 (1988) (quoting
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 608 (rev. 4th ed. 1968)). This is an application of the canon
of construction, "ejusdem generis" which presumes that legislators intend to apply the
same qualities to similar items. Id. Representative Griffin's statement indicates that
this presumption is accurate with regard to the Equal Pay Act's statutory defenses. See
supra text accompanying note 143.
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at least systematically and objectively" (the "systematic, objective
system" test).145 In Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co. ,146 the
Fifth Circuit held the "objective" requirement to be equivalent to the
factor-other-than-sex defense's "substantive gender-neutrality"
requirement. 147 The court noted as evidence of objectivity "several
instances . . . where females were advanced over males as a result of
the merit and seniority system. ,148
Victoria Bank & Trust also demonstrates the parallel between
the "systematic" requirement and the gender-neutral test's "equal
application" requirement. There, the Fifth Circuit accepted the
bank's proffered seniority/merit system defense in part based upon
the fact that the system applied equally to all employees below the
level of "department head. "149
Like most systems, which qualify as factors other than sex, 5
a majority of seniority, merit and incentive systems will relate to the
performance of the complaining employee's specific job duties. 5 '
But, also like the factor-other-than-sex defense, the seniority, merit
143 Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 1970)
(establishing the standard for merit systems); see Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co.,
493 F.2d 896, 901 (5th Cir. 1974) (extending the test used in Brookhaven to seniority
systems).
'4 493 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974).
7 Id. at 901 (finding that a seniority/merit system did not classify employees by
sex); see Marshall v. St. John Valley Sec. Home, 560 F.2d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1977)
(finding that the defendant's informal seniority/merit system was valid because it was
based upon length of service "and special usefulness rather than maleness"); EEOC v.
Whitin Mach. Works, Inc., 635 F.2d 1095, 1098 n.6 (4th Cir. 1980) (upholding a
district court's ruling that the defendant had failed to meet its burden of showing that the
pay differential between male and female employees was the result of a gender-neutral
system, equally applied).
1" Victoria Bank & Trust, 493 F.2d at 901.
1 9 Compare id. at 900 (noting that the seniority system was applied to all employees
below the department head position) and Whitin Mach. Works, 635 F.2d at 1097 n.6
(upholding a district court's ruling that the defendant failed to meet its burden of
showing that the pay differential between male and female employees resulted from a
seniority system applied without regard to sex) with Schultz v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank,
420 F.2d 648, 656 (5th Cir. 1969) (rejecting as a factor other than sex a "training
program" where only male workers "participated" in the program).
1" See supra text accompanying notes 93-96.
151 See, e.g., EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 1988) (job
performance rewarded by promotions or pay adjustments).
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and incentive system defenses are not limited to systems related to the
performance of specific job duties. For example, a seniority system
which rewards an employee solely on the basis of time worked for a
firm qualifies for the seniority system exception, even though the
employee has either changed jobs within the firm or transferred to a
new department. 152 Similarly, rewarding employees for their previous
military service may constitute a valid merit system, though it is not
job-related. 53
The fact that seniority and merit systems include non-job-
related systems reinforces the parallel between the systematic,
objective system test and the factor-other-than-sex defense's gender-
neutral standard. In order to construct the four exceptions
consistently, courts should apply the gender-neutral standard to
employers asserting a factor-other-than-sex defense.
C. Interpreting the Equal Pay Act Harmoniously with Title VII
Congress attempted to harmonize the Equal Pay Act and Title
VII through the Bennett Amendment, 54 because the two acts "serve
152 Victoria Bank & Trust, 493 F.2d at 900 (accepting a seniority system which
calculated an employee's salary partly based upon prior employment in a different
position and department); see James MeCollum, Title VII v. Seniority: Ensuring Rights
or Denying Rights?, 26 How. L.J. 1485, 1511 (1983) (quoting California Brewers Ass'n
v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 606 (1980), which defined seniority systems on the basis of
an employee's "time secured in employment").
153 See Hodgsonv. Victoria Bank& Trust Co., 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8,475,
7,298 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 1973) aff'd in part, rev'd in part on different grounds, Brennan
v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974). Like the Seventh Circuit's
decision regarding a veterans-only law in Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir.
1989), see supra text accompanying notes 48-49, the district court should have
scrutinized the gender-related aspect of military service before accepting it as a basis for
a wage classification system.
"" County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170 (1981) (holding that the Bennett
Amendment incorporates the Equal Pay Act's four affirmative defenses into Title VII).
The Bennett Amendment, Title VII § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988), provides
in pertinent part that, "[i]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice under . . .
[Title VII] for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the
amount of wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees . . . if such
differentiation is authorized by the provisions of [29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988)-the Equal
Pay Act]."
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the same fundamental [antidiscriminatory] purpose.", 5 Subsequently,
the Supreme Court held that courts and administrative agencies must
consistently interpret the two statutes' like provisions.t16 "Otherwise,
[courts and agencies] might develop inconsistent bodies of case law
interpreting two sets of nearly identical language."' 57 Accordingly,
courts read the two statutes in pari materia, so that "neither statute
[is] interpreted in a manner that would undermine the other."' 8
In order to resolve the disagreement over the Equal Pay Act's
factor-other-than-sex exception, it is instructive to compare Title
VII's theories of recovery and their standards for employers'
affirmative defenses. Title VII provides remedies under two
theories-disparate treatment and disparate impact. Disparate
treatment claims proscribe practices intended to discriminate on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.'59 Disparate
impact theory does not require a showing of discriminatory motive,
but focuses instead on the question of whether an employer's facially
neutral practice disproportionately disadvantages members of a
protected class. 160
As discussed below, courts treat Equal Pay Act claims like
disparate treatment claims. Accordingly, an employer's defenses to
an Equal Pay Act claim should parallel the standard applied to an
employer's defenses to Title VII disparate treatment claims. Title VII
mandates a standard for defenses to disparate treatment claims which
is much like the gender-neutral standard for the factor-other-than-sex
exception.
155 Ammons v. Zia, 448 F.2d 117, 119 (10th Cir. 1971) (quoting Shultz v. Wheaton
Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 266 (3d Cir. 1970)).
156 Gunther, 452 U.S. at 170.
157 Id.
158 Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
159 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-2(d) (1988); see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 800-01 (1973) (noting that Title VII was enacted to "eliminate those
discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job
environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens").
'60 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (Supp. IV 1993). Individuals are protected from
being classified by virtue of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
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1. Title VII Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact Claims
A year after passing the Equal Pay Act, Congress enacted
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in an attempt to proscribe
employer practices, such as failing to, or refusing to hire or
discharging any individual, or otherwise discriminating against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges or employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex or national origin.1
61
Under Title VII, an employee may challenge employment
practices under two distinct theories-disparate treatment and
disparate impact. Different concepts of equality underlie these two
theories. Disparate treatment aims to create equal opportunities
through neutral treatment. Disparate impact attempts to achieve equal
outcomes, regardless of the propriety of the employers' motives.
a. Disparate Treatment Claims
Disparate treatment claims consider whether an employer
intended to treat an employee unfavorably because of the employee's
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.' 62 In order to make out
a prima facie case of disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show: (1)
membership in a protected class; 163 (2) qualification and application
for the job, salary or benefit in question; and (3) denial of the job,
salary or benefit, that the position remained open, and that the
employer sought another employee with the plaintiff's
qualifications.
161 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
162 Disparate treatment . . . is the most easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color religion, sex, or
national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although
it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of
differences in treatment.
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
163 Individuals are protected from being classified by virtue of their race, color,
religion, sex or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
" McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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Making out a prima facie case gives rise to a rebuttable
presumption of discrimination. 6 ' The defendant may rebut this
presumption by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for its conduct.166 Not any non-discriminatory reason is legitimate.
In order to satisfy its burden, the defendant must provide a credible
explanation for its conduct. 167 The defendant need not show that it
was actually motivated by the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason;
the defendant must provide evidence that would justify a judgment in
its favor.
61
Once the defendant has sufficiently shown a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for its conduct, the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff for rebuttal. 69 The plaintiff may rebut with a showing of
discriminatory intent, or that the defendant's legitimate non-
discriminatory reason is a pretext for discrimination.17
Discriminatory intent and/or pretext is shown through evidence that
an employee's race, color, sex, religion or national origin was a "but
for" cause of the employer's actions. 171
b. Disparate Impact Claims
Unlike disparate treatment claims, a disparate impact claim
does not require the plaintiff to prove discriminatory motives.
Rather, disparate impact cases look to practices which, though
5 United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983).
166 Id.
" Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981).
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804-05 (noting that the plaintiff may show
pretext through evidence that whites or males having qualifications like the plaintiff's
were treated better than the plaintiff, or that the defendant treated the plaintiff
discriminatorily in other contexts, or that the defendant had a general policy aimed at the
protected class of which plaintiff is a member). However-, the plaintiff is not limited to
the above offers of proof-a plaintiff may offer other evidence which tends to show
pretext or discriminatory intent. Id.
171 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976).
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facially neutral, adversely effect members of a protected class.172 To
make out a prima facie case, a complaining employee must show:
That a [defendant] uses a particular employment
practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin and the
[defendant] fails to demonstrate that the challenged
practice is job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity."'
Disparate impact may be shown through statistical or other
evidence comparing the racial or gender composition of the job or the
disputed salary to the racial or gender composition of the population
in the labor market for individuals qualified to do the job at issue.174
If the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts
to the defendant to prove the "business necessity" of the challenged
practice.'75 "Business necessity" is proven if the defendant shows
that the challenged practice is related to the performance of the
complaining employee's job duties.176
The plaintiff may rebut the defendant's proof of job-
relatedness by showing that alternative employment practices existed
which would have attained defendant's goals without adversely
affecting protected class members, and that the defendant refused to
adopt such alternative measures. 177
'72 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (holding that although
Title VII does not proscribe a requirement that an employee have a high school diploma
or pass an intelligence test, such a requirement cannot be used to foster discriminatory
hiring practices).
'7 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 1993).
" International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339.
175 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
37 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 1993); see Dothard, 433 U.S. at
329-30.
177 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. IV 1993); see Dothard, 433 U.S. at
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2. Title VIi's Affirmative Defenses as Parallels to the Equal Pay
Act's Affirmative Defenses
Title VII's business-necessity defense parallels Aldrich v.
Randolph Central School District' st7 1 job-relatedness standard for
factors other than sex. 179 Under Title VII, in order to show business
necessity, an employer must demonstrate with affirmative evidence
that the challenged practice is job-related.' Similarly, Aldrich
requires an employer to show through affirmative evidence that its
challenged wage practice is reasonably related to the complaining
employee's job or job duties. 8'
Likewise, Title VII's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
test substantially parallels the Equal Pay Act's gender-neutral test.
For example, in McCosh v. City of Grand Forks,82 the Eighth Circuit
rejected a disparate treatment challenge to the City's policy requiring
every police sergeant to have at least one year of patrol experience,
to carry a weapon at all times while on duty, and to have completed
a basic training course.' 83 The court found no violations of Title VII
because, even though these policies prohibited the plaintiff, a fifty-
eight year old female staff officer, from being promoted (leading to
her eventual discharge), the City applied the requirements to every
officer, without regard to sex.' 84
The Third Circuit similarly applied a gender-neutral, equally
applied analysis to the defendant's proffered legitimate, non-
178 963 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1992).
79 Id. at 525.
"'0 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) ("[Dliscriminatory
tests are impermissible unless shown . . . to be 'predictive or significantly correlated
with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or
jobs for which candidates are being evaluated."' (quoting EEOC Uniform Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(C) (1970))).
11 Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525; see supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
182 628 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1063.
184 Id. at 1063-64; see Chavis v. Whitehall Lab., Inc.',-664 F. Supp. 413, 421 (N.D.
Ind. 1986) (holding that defendant's policy of discharging employees because of
excessive absenteeism is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason where the policy applies
to all employees, regardless of race).
272 NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. XI
discriminatory reason in Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-
Cohen.185 The Third Circuit reversed the district court's finding that
the defendant's proffered, non-discriminatory reason was not credible
because, when considering associate lawyers for promotion to
partner, the defendant required a high standard of analytical ability
without showing that such a requirement was necessary to perform
the duties of a partner.186 The court stated that the district court erred
by evaluating the requirement's relationship to the partner's job
duties. 8 7 The court reasoned that the defendant had satisfied the
legitimate, non-discriminatory test, because it applied the analytical
ability requirement with equal aplomb to all of its associates, male
and female. 188
The parallel between the two statutes' standards reveals that
the best standard by which to measure the factor-other-than-sex
defense is the one which corresponds to the theory of recovery
embraced by the Equal Pay Act. The next section argues that the
Equal Pay Act embraces disparate treatment claims, and rejects
disparate impact claims. Thus, the proper standard to apply to the
factor-other-than-sex defense is the gender-neutral test, as it parallels
the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason test applied to Title VII
disparate treatment claims.
3. The Equal Pay Act as a Disparate Treatment Statute
The parallel between the two statutes' standards suggests that
where Equal Pay Act claims are like disparate treatment claims, the
gender-neutral standard should apply, and where they are like
disparate impact claims, the job-relatedness standard should apply.189
However, as discussed below, courts do not entertain disparate
185 983 F.2d 509, 537-39 (3d Cir. 1992).
6 d. at 528-29.
19 Id.
18Id. at 539.
189 SULLIVAN, ET AL., supra note 5, at 624-25 (arguing for incorporation of the
disparate treatment/disparate impact standards into the Equal Pay Act, but noting that
there is "equivocal" evidence that the standards have been adopted in this manner by the
courts).
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impact claims under the Equal Pay Act, leaving them instead to Title
VII causes of action. 9 ° The Equal Pay Act's limitation to disparate
treatment types of claims does not render the comparison to Title VII
useless. Rather, it is precisely because the Equal Pay Act is limited
to disparate treatment types of claims that the analogy to Title VII is
helpful. Because the two statutes overlap only with regard to
disparate treatment claims, courts should apply in all Equal Pay Act
cases the standard analogous to the Title VII disparate treatment
standard, that is, the gender-neutral standard.
The Equal Pay Act definitely permits recovery for disparate
treatment types of claims.191 The Supreme Court embraced the
concept of disparate treatment under the Equal Pay Act in Corning
Glass Works Co. v. Brennan,'92 where it held that the deciding factor
in paying women less than men was the fact that they were women.' 93
The Court later held, in City of Los Angeles Department of Water &
Power v. Manhart,'9 that even empirically-based differences between
the sexes cannot qualify as factors other than sex under the Equal Pay
Act.' 95 Lower courts have similarly entertained disparate treatment
types of Equal Pay Act claims. Under a disparate treatment analysis,
courts have considered claims involving wage disparities based upon
training programs which exclude employees based upon their
gender,' 96 or which are pretexts for discrimination.' 97 Also, courts
"9 Paul N. Cox, Equal Work, Comparable Work and Disparate Treatment: An
Argument for Narrowly Construing County of Washington v. Gunther, 22 DUQ. L. REV.
65, 67, 111 (1983) (arguing that Gunther limited the Equal Pay Act to disparate
treatment claims); William B. Gould, 7he Supreme Court's Labor and Employment
Docket in the 1980 Term: Justice Brennan's Term, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 66 (1981).
But see Winn Newman & Jeanne M. Vonhof, "Separate But Equal"-Job Segregation
and Pay Equity in the Wake of Gunther, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 289 (1981) (arguing
that Gunther did not reach the question of disparate impact's applicability to the Equal
Pay Act); Edith Barnett, Note, Proving Title VII Sex-Based Discrimination Claims After
County of Wash. v. Gunther, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1669, 1691-92 (1982).
'9' SULLIVAN, ET AL., supra note 5, at 624-25.
'9' 417 U.S. 188 (1973).
"9 Id. at 204-05; see supra text accompanying notes 22-31.
'94 435 U.S. 702 (1977).
tId. at 709-10; see supra text accompanying notes,32-36.
'9 E.g., Hodgsonv. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973).
197 E.g., Schultz v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 420 F.2d 648, 659 (5th Cir. 1969).
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have applied this analysis to routine and objective seniority systems,
which may cause a disparate impact.198
In contrast, courts have rejected Equal Pay Act claims despite
the fact that the employers' proffered factor other than sex had a
disparate impact on female workers.' 99 In no case has a court
embraced a disparate impact cause of action under the Equal Pay
Act.
200
In Fallon v. Illinois,2"' the Seventh Circuit upheld as a valid
factor other than sex, under Title VII, a state law requiring that a
certain class of employees be military veterans, despite the fact that
an overwhelming number of veterans are male. 20 ' The Seventh
Circuit expressly rejected a district court's reasoning that veteran
status is not a valid factor other than sex where it has a disparate
impact.203
Similarly, in Peters v. City of Shreveport, ° the Fifth Circuit
found that compliance with a minimum wage law constituted a factor
other than sex, even though the consequence was paying a class of
primarily male fire department employees more than a class of mostly
female police department employees.0 5 Peters is consistent with the
Fifth Circuit's earlier interpretation of the Act as prohibiting pay
19 E.g., Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896, 900-01 (5th Cir.
1974).
199 See, e.g., Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir.
1992).
200 See Cox, supra note 190, at 79-85 (arguing that although wage disparities
defended on the basis of "market forces" looks like a disparate impact sort of claim,
such systems inherently rely upon notions of gender, and are therefore disparate
treatment types of claims); SULLIVAN, ET AL., supra note 5, at 625 (acknowledging that
there is "equivocal" evidence of judicial recognition of a disparate impact cause of action
under the Equal Pay Act).
201 882 F.2d 1206 (7th Cir. 1989).
22 Id. at 1212; see supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
203 Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1212; see Ende v. Board of Regents, 757 F.2d 176, 183 (7th
Cir. 1985) (upholding an affirmative action plan, although it had a disparate impact on
male professionals).
204 818 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1987).
205 Id. at 1162-63; see supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
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disparities only where an employer pays its employees differently
because of their sex. 2 °6
The Ninth Circuit considered the possible disparate impact of
basing wages on an employee's prior salary in Kouba v. Allstate
Insurance Co. 2 °7 Lola Kouba represented a class of female insurance
agents who alleged that Allstate's practice of basing wages on agents'
prior salaries created a wage differential in violation of Title VII.
2°8
Though the Ninth Circuit failed to explicitly recognize the Equal Pay
Act as a disparate treatment statute,20 9 it remanded the case with
instructions to the district court to analyze Allstate's proffered defense
using the disparate treatment test of "but for" causation.210
Even though courts which apply the job-relatedness standard
to Equal Pay Act claims have adopted a test consonant with disparate
impact claims, 11 none of them has recognized a disparate impact
cause of action under the Equal Pay Act. Moreover, the analysis
these courts undertake parallels the disparate treatment analysis
outlined by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green.21 2
In Aldrich v. Randolph Central School District,"3 the plaintiff
neither claimed, nor offered evidence that her employer's civil
service examination requirement produced a disparate impact on
' Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1133-34 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[Plemer
has not] offered any direct evidence ... that Parsons-Gilbane paid her less than it would
have had she been male.").
207 691 F.2d 873, 874-75 (9th Cir. 1982); see supra text accompanying notes 60-65.
2m Kouba, 691.F.2d at 875. Apparently, Kouba opted not to bring an Equal Pay Act
claim for strategic reasons unrelated to the substantive questions discussed in this article.
Id. at 875 n.3.
9 The Ninth Circuit adopted the legitimate business reason standard. Id. at 876.
210 Compare id. at 877-78 (requiring Allstate to prove that its wage-incentive
program accounted for the wage disparity during employees' initial training periods) with
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976) (requiring a
showing that race was a "but for" cause of the defendant's disciplinary policy).
211 Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1972) (requiring a
showing that the employment practice at issue reasonably relates to the complaining
employee's job), with Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525 (holding that a valid factor other than
sex must be reasonably related to the performance of the employee's job duties).
212 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).
213 963 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1992).
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female employees.214 Had the plaintiff been able to do so, she could
have brought a disparate impact claim under Title VII.215 The Second
Circuit noted that Equal Pay Act claims do not require proof of
adverse effect, and implied that disparate impact claims were properly
brought under Title VII, not the Equal Pay Act.216 The court
conceded that, "if Aldrich were pursuing only a Title VII [disparate
treatment] claim, the school district would not have to establish the
job-relatedness of the custodian's exam unless [Aldrich] first showed
the exam had a disparate impact. 
217
Because Aldrich never claimed disparate impact under the
Equal Pay Act, the Second Circuit's importation of a disparate impact
job-relatedness requirement into an Equal Pay Act is anomalous and
without a conceptual basis. The error in Aldrich is that the court
attempted to impose a disparate impact standard upon a disparate
treatment claim.
In a similarly inconsistent opinion, Hodgson v. Brookhaven
General Hospital,218 the Fifth Circuit required a showing of job-
relatedness for the defendant's proffered factor-other-than-sex defense
based upon different educational qualifications between male orderlies
and female nurse's aides. 219 Yet, despite requiring job-relatedness for
the-factor-other-than-sex exception, the court held that a merit
system, one of the other statutory exceptions in the Equal Pay Act,
required only a showing that the system was administered
"systematically and objectively. ",220
Like Ms. Aldrich, the plaintiffs in Brookhaven did not claim
disparate impact. Like the Second Circuit, the Fifth Circuit imposed
a job-relatedness standard upon the factor-other-than-sex defense, but
left the remainder of the Equal Pay Act within a disparate treatment
framework. 221 Further, even though the court required Brookhaven
to demonstrate job-relatedness, the court's evaluation of the defense
214 Id. at 526-27.
215 Id. at 527.
216 Id.
217 Id.
28 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970).





looked to the treatment of Brookhaven's employees, and did not
evaluate whether Brookhaven's practices created a pattern of conduct
adversely affecting women.22 Thus, the Fifth Circuit effectively
engaged in a disparate treatment analysis in a disparate treatment
case, but held the defendant to a disparate impact, job-relatedness
standard.
The fact that the Second and Fifth Circuits imported a
disparate impact test into an Equal Pay Act context should not be
mistaken for the proposition that the Equal Pay Act recognizes a
cause of action for disparate impact. Either circuit court could have
characterized the claim as one of disparate impact, but neither did.
Moreover, the Second Circuit implied, rightly, that Title VII, and not
the Equal Pay Act, is the proper vehicle for bringing disparate impact
claims. 2 3 The disparate treatment-type of facts in the cases before
the Second and Fifth Circuits suggests that the application of the job-
relatedness standard is anomalous. More importantly, the Equal Pay
Act's disparate treatment character strongly suggests that the job-
relatedness standard cannot be properly applied to Equal Pay Act
claims.
V. Conclusion
The Equal Pay Act's legislative history shows Congress'
intention to create an open-ended exception for nondiscriminating
employers while achieving the Act's antidiscriminatory purposes.
These antidiscriminatory goals carried over into Title VII, compelling
both Congress and the judiciary to harmonize the two statutes'
structure and substance. The two Acts' close relationship provides
courts with dispositive guidance for resolving the authoritative dispute
with regard to the factor-other-than-sex defense's proper standard.
That the gender-neutral standard is the best standard is evidenced not
2 Id.; see Glenn v. General Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1570 (11th Cir. 1988)
(holding that an employer's claim that it had an unwritten policy requiring all hourly
employees to take a pay cut in order to be promoted to a salaried position did not justify
paying women less than men in such salaried positions).
m Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 526.
2771994]
278 NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. XI
only by analogy to Title VII's disparate treatment standard, but also
by the conceptual consistency of applying the same standard to all
four of the Equal Pay Act's statutory defenses.
